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Factors Influencing the Equity Share of Build-Operate-Transfer Projects 
Abstract 
Purpose – To determine the fundamental factors influencing the equity share in Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) investments in relation to the project risk profile. 
Design/methodology/approach – The relationships between risk factors and equity 
participation into the capital structure of a BOT contract are examined using regression 
analysis of a dataset of toll road projects. 
Findings – Results suggest that the inflation rate, the size of the investment, the construction 
period, the solidity of the vehicle company, and the organizational structure of the project are 
significant variables of the equity portion of financing. 
Practical implications – The analysis may support project promoters with better 
understanding of the factors that might facilitate high debt leverages and lending institutions 
with valuable information to integrate the method of determining the appropriate debt 
resources to be injected into a BOT project. 
Originality/value – The study contributes towards growing the body of knowledge regarding 
the way public-private partnership initiatives are carried over and helps refine the capital 
structures of BOT projects. 
Keywords Build-Operate-Transfer, Infrastructures, Project Finance, Project Management, 
Regression Analysis, Risk management, Roads 
Paper type Research paper 
Introduction 
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) delivery system has gained worldwide popularity as a 
mechanism to limit public spending on governments’ budgets and facilitate private financing 
of desirable public facility projects (Algarni et al. 2007). In particular, pay toll road projects 
have been accounting for an important share of the investment among all types of BOT 
arrangements in the past two decades in both, developed and developing, countries (Medda 
and Carbonaro 2007; World Bank 2007). 
Under a BOT scheme, the funding required to meet the capital expenditure necessary to 
construct or renovate an infrastructure is provided in the forms of both equity and debt 
sources. Even though the capital structure varies, equity financing typically covers from 10 to 
30% of total project costs, while debt financing is obtained for the remaining 70 to 90% 
(Finnerty, 2007). 
 On the one hand, one or more private organizations, such as construction firms, service 
providers, and investors share the equity funding of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) company 
to design, build and operate the infrastructure for a specified concession period of time, 
intended to sufficiently pay off the debt incurred and earn an acceptable profit. At the end of 
this period, the ownership of the project is transferred back to the awarding authority 
(Jefferies and McGeorge, 2009). 
On the other hand, lending institutions provide the debt portion of funding under the terms of 
nonrecourse financing in a way that lenders have no recourse for repayment of their loans 
against the shareholders, but only through the SPV’s segregated cash flows and assets (Zhang 
2005a). 
Moreover, some BOT highway projects may also include the financial support from host 
governments at one or more stages of the project, usually under the form of either funding aid 
fiscal subsidies for operations, off-take agreements or a combination of them. 
The debt to equity ratio for financing the capital structure of a BOT project varies according 
to the risk profiles borne by the contract parties. To obtain an attractive rate of return on 
equity (RRE) through a minimized equity investment and associated risk, equity holders 
usually seek to maximize the debt leverage as much as the project cash flow can justify. 
On the contrary, lending institutions tend to require a large equity commitment in the SPV to 
reduce the risk of a heavy debt service burden on the project cash streams (Walker 1995) and 
avoid investors from being in a position of easily walking away from the project (Nevitt and 
Fabozzi 2000). Lenders calculate debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) as a supporting 
method to establish the project’s debt capacity and, as a result, to determine the matching 
equity contribution to the capital investment. Usually, high DSCRs are requested by lending 
institutions to bear high project risks; this requires a high level of equity level, which brings 
subsequent reduced profitability. 
Therefore, it is of great interest to both, shareholders and lenders, to achieve the capital 
structure that maximizes the RRE with a tolerable debt level (Dias and Ioannou 1995).  
Several studies have been proposed to investigate the risk, in association with an optimized 
capital structure of a BOT infrastructure project.  Nevertheless, little work has explored the 
empirical effects and other macro risk factors that might have a relationship with the equity 
level of BOT projects. 
To this end, a statistical analysis on the capital structures of a set of recent BOT toll road 
contracts is provided to study some relevant factors that might have significant relationships 
with the equity participation in project funding. 
In the next sections, we first review pertinent literature and gain an understanding of the risks 
involved in the capital structure of a BOT project. Then, a risk model is developed to 
anticipate the relationship with the equity investment. Finally, we present a linear regression 
analysis and discuss the results as an attempt to draw potential applications for the 
establishment of improved capital structures in infrastructure BOT projects. 
Literature review 
Extensive literature and discussion is available around various issues related to the study of 
the BOT contracting system. A number of authors, conveniently reviewed by Shen et al. 
(2002), have recently developed a variety of methods and models mainly focusing on BOT 
organization, contracting procedure, financial attractiveness, and concession period. 
Moreover, a relevant stream of research is committed to developing suitable methodologies 
to optimize the capital structure and, in particular, to integrate the effect of risks as part of 
those factors that are involved in a BOT financing scheme. 
Professional practice and previous research have found evidence that the DSCR is a sound 
indicator for establishing the debt leverage and, in turn, for determining the corresponding 
equity participation into the initial investment (Bakatjan et al. 2003). DSCR is referred to as 
the amount of cash flow available to meet annual interest and principal payments on debt, 
including any sinking fund payments, and it is computed as the ratio between operating cash 
flow and debt service during a one-year period (Esty 2006). The minimum DSCR must be 
greater than the one to meet the debt capacity. But, the lending agencies actually ask for a 
higher value, according to the expected operating cash flow and anticipated risk of the 
project. Thus, since the concessionaire takes an important commitment to the project and a 
broad scope of risk, it appears that DSCR is set at high levels not only whenever a high debt 
risk is anticipated, but also whenever several potential risk factors are associated to the equity 
portion of investment (Zhang 2005b). Moreover, a high level of equity plays an important 
role to assure the granting government against future uncertainty of project financing (Tiong 
1995). 
With regard to this aspect, antecedent authors propose models to identify risks inherent with 
BOT contracts and provide linkages between risk sources and the capital structure. These 
studies can be subsumed into two main streams. A first course of study explores the effects of 
risk on project profitability. With this regard, Zhang (2005a) builds a theoretical methodology 
to optimize the capital structure and evaluate the project financial viability when the project is 
subject to construction risk, bankruptcy risk, and other various economic uncertainties. So 
that an optimal capital structure is determined to safeguard the diverse interests of both, 
equity investors and debt lenders. Similarly, based on the notion that the equity amount to be 
injected to the facility varies according to risk, Ng et al. (2010) explore the risks faced by 
private partners in a concession-based road project. Furthermore they illustrate a Monte Carlo 
simulation model, where the revenue is the uncertain parameter considered under the 
influence of inflation, traffic flow and operational cost risks to determine the equity level and 
associated RRE. 
A second pertinent stream of research is dedicated to identifying risks inherent with BOT 
project financing. Three studies, addressing this subject, are acknowledged to be seminal 
antecedents of our risk model, namely: the proposal, by Zayed and Chang (2002), of a 
consistent procedure for assessing BOT project risk through the definition of a risk index and 
project ranking methodology based on actual performance of eight main risk areas, i.e., 
political, financial, revenue, promoting, procurement, development, construction, and 
operations risks; the analysis, by Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003), on transportation 
and power-generation projects that identifies political, financial, construction, operational, 
and market risks, and states that the risks reported to be most significant in financing strategy 
selection are the political, financial, and market risks; and Xenidis and Angelides’ (2005) 
comprehensive list of state-rooted, concessionaire-rooted, and market-rooted financial risks 
with classification based on the stage at which they occur and the sources of their origin. 
However, even though equity risk is affirmed to be central in the definition of the optimal 
capital structure and risk taxonomies are provided, very little previous work is reported with 
focus on the empirical assessment of the risk factors that might affect the equity portion of 
funding. 
To overcome this limitation and understand the extent to which risk factors might influence 
the equity share of the investment, risk identification, covering different aspects of BOT toll 
road projects, is unveiled in the next sections together with a statistical analysis. 
Methodology 
The research is developed according to the following steps. First, an original model is 
developed based on the reviewed seminal literature for indentifying the main risk factors that 
might influence the level of equity participation in BOT toll road projects. Based on this, risk 
sources are listed with associated indicators, which, in turn, are measured by one or more 
corresponding measurable parameters. Second, data are gathered through public web sources 
and websites of the main private partners of the projects, and consistently checked with direct 
enquiries. Afterwards, an exploratory data analysis is conducted and finally, after assuming 
that the equity share (ES) is the response variable and the risk parameters are the independent 
variables, a linear regression analysis is performed using MiniTab™ software package to 
understand the relationship between the project risk profile and the capital structure. In 
particular, the linear regression analysis tests if the independent variables considered are 
relevant factors and whether they have positive or negative impact on the equity portion of 
funding. Linear regression has proved to be a valuable and widely used tool for investigating 
managerial factors and reflecting relationships among variables within datasets. This 
predominant methodology can be applied to quantify the strength of a relationship between a 
dependent variable and independent regressors (Tukey 1977). 
Risk Model 
Managing risks in BOT projects is a challenging job due to the uncertainty related to 
forecasted cash flows and a scrupulous risk analysis is desirable, because of the role it plays 
in determining the capital structure of a project (Jin 2010). 
Table 1 reports a novel classification of risk sources, indicators, and measurable parameters 
that are reported to affect BOT projects. The risks are categorized into different areas of 
origin, namely: country, financial, revenue, project, and SPV originated risks. These 
categories are identified with reference to the above seminal literature works: the country and 
financial risks match the political or state-rooted risk; revenue risks represent the market 
areas of risks; the project risk is intended to cover the construction and operations risks; and 
the SPV-related risks are inherent with the concessionaire-rooted risks. 
A further explanation of the table is given in the following sections. 
Risk sources Indicators Parameters 
Country Investment environment 
Attractiveness 
 
Country index 
Government effectiveness 
Regulatory quality 
 
Financial Cost of equity capital 
Inflation 
Currency 
Average beta of partners 
Inflation rate 
Currency exchange rate 
 
Revenue Utility Population within the area 
Project Size 
Complexity 
Profitability 
 
Investment 
Construction duration 
Concession period 
SPV Composition 
Solidity 
Number of partners in SPV 
Average size of partners 
Table 1. Risk identification 
Country risk 
The country risk concerns the credibility and political conditions of the host country 
(Kumaraswamy and Zhang 2001). In this paper, country risk is described by means of two 
indicators, namely: the ‘Investment environment’ and the ‘Attractiveness’. The ‘Investment 
environment’ expresses the political and economic stability, measured by a numerical 
transformed parameter of the COFACE (2008) alphanumerical ‘Country index’ (CI): a low 
figure standing for a high ranking to show off steady political and economic environment, 
good payment records and very weak default probability. The ‘Attractiveness’ indicates 
whether a country is able to draw investments, which depends upon the access to politics, 
level of competition, fiscal terms, and domination of narrow interests that could hinder the 
efficiency of the project. For the purpose of the model and with specific regard to BOT 
projects, a country’s Attractiveness is measured via two select parameters provided by World 
Bank (2011): the ‘Government Effectiveness’ (GE) parameter, ranked on a scale from -2.5 
(low efficiency) to 2.5 (high efficiency), captures the perceptions that investors have of a 
country with regard to the quality of public services, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies; the 
‘Regulatory Quality’ (RQ) parameter, that ranges from -2.5 (scarce quality) to 2.5 (high 
quality), is recorded to indicate the perception of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
Financial Risk 
Financial risk is driven by cost of capital, inflation and currency (Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut, 2003). From a business perspective, it is the risk of financial loss due to 
changes in the competitive environment, or the extent to which the organization could timely 
adapt to external changes (Doff, 2008). 
Since the purpose of this study is to explore the factors affecting the equity share in BOT toll 
road projects, the cost of equity is specifically taken into consideration to address the cost of 
capital financial risk. The cost of equity capital is measured by the proxy parameter “Average 
Beta of Partner”, which is referred to as the correlated risk between the SPV and the 
associated market. The expected RRE can be estimated using the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM); according to CAPM, the expected return is a function of a firm’s equity Beta 
(Tofallis, 2008). A high Beta stands for elevated risk, which, in turn, determines a highly 
expected interest rate on the equity capital brought into the project. The Beta figures 
considered are provided by the Financial Times (2009). 
Inflation also plays a major role in affecting revenue and costs. Typically, the equity sources 
of financing reduce as an effect of inflation-increased cash flow generation, and vice-versa. 
Inflation, here, is measured by the “Inflation Rate” (IR), referred to as the annual percent 
variation of market prices, as reported by Inflation Data (2011). 
A BOT project might be funded with foreign investment. So, we consider how the currency 
risk might affect the level of equity. In fact, since both, toll revenue and operations costs, 
might be generated in local currency, while capital repayments might be in foreign currency, 
a downfall of the exchange rate could jeopardize the equity investment (Kapila and 
Hendrickson, 2001). Here, the currency exchange is measured as the rate of conversion of the 
local currencies into US dollars, as reported by XE (2011). 
Revenue risk 
The revenue risk lies in the project’s market demand and concerns its ability of generating 
enough income to repay the debt incurred and to assure fair equity profitability. In BOT toll-
road projects, overoptimistic estimation of traffic flows, due to inaccurate assumptions, or the 
opening of alternative routes may jeopardize toll-booth income. Off-take agreements with the 
granting authority are sometimes negotiated to assure steady cash flows over the concession 
period, in spite of market fluctuation (Beidleman et al. 1990). However, this research 
considers projects with revenue risk only, that is, with risks inherent to booth collection of 
tolls. 
The revenue risk is specified by the ‘Utility’ gain that the new highway road brings to the 
regional community of potential toll payers. Rather than a projected traffic flow factor, here 
we adopt a more reliable ‘Population within the area’ (POP) parameter to proxy the 
motorization of the region: a larger population, potentially affected by the infrastructure, 
enhances the utility and gives the project a higher chance of revenue. The parameter, in units 
of millions of people, sums up the 2008 population records of all cities crossed by the road 
(Wikipedia, 2008). 
Project risks 
‘Size’, ‘Complexity’, and ‘Concession’ are specific drivers of project risk. Typically, the size 
of a project is an important factor to determine the financial resources required and the 
burden for promoters to raise equity funds. Also, a large-sized scope of work might 
experience the risk of great cost overruns (Tiong 1990). ‘Investment’ (INV) is the numerical 
parameter used here for measuring the project ‘Size’, indexed in millions of US dollars as per 
the 2009 present value. 
Risk is also driven by the project complexity resulting from construction site conditions, 
sophisticated design, tight schedule pressure, innovative building technologies, and 
construction logistics. Project complexity typically results in delayed completion, increased 
amount of loan interest, and deferred revenues. It is assumed here that long construction 
duration is an inherent significant characteristic of a complex project (Hoffman et al. 2007), 
so that the parameter, ‘Construction duration’ (CDUR), evaluated in number of years, is used 
for the purpose of quantifying the project complexity. 
The riskiness of a project is also inherently driven by the objective capability of its cash flow 
to repay the debt and return profit. Typically, a longer period of operations provides better 
opportunity for generating incomes (Shen et al. 2002). Therefore, the length of the concession 
period, from occupancy to transfer, is usually determined to assure attractiveness and protect 
the interests of both, the public owner and the concessionaire (Shen and Wu 2005). A 
proposed project, with an expected high RRE, typically, tends to have a shorter concession 
period. On the contrary, if a project lacks appropriate profitability, the public party will most 
likely have to consider a longer concession period in order to safeguard the multiple interests 
of the public sector and the profit-making attraction of the private sector (Zhang 2009). Thus, 
the ‘Profitability’ driver of project risk is quantified through the parameter ‘Concession 
period’ (CPER) here, defined as the number of years during which the SPV operates the road 
and collects the toll fees. 
SPV risks 
Indicators of ‘SPV composition’ and ‘SPV solidity’ are adopted to describe the risks related 
to the concession vehicle company. The SPV composition reflects the organizational 
structure of the project. The SPV capital can be shared by construction contractors, 
professional service providers, funding sponsors, operations management companies, and 
other various business entities. Local companies most often take part in the SPV because of 
local policy requirements, expected greater odds of competitive advantages in the tender 
process, and minimization of currency risk. 
A fragmentation of the SPV composition can bring better risk sharing. However, this might 
also increase the possibility of contractual and management problems occurring during the 
operations and maintenance period (Trujillo et al. 1997), turning the causal mental model, 
describing the relationship between SPV composition and equity capital structure of BOT 
projects, as unclear. The parameter, ‘Number of partners in SPV’ (PART), is used here to 
quantify the ‘SPV composition’. 
 The ‘SPV solidity’ measures the durability of the vehicle company as a financially 
independent business entity to raise the required fund for the project, repay the debt and make 
profit. Even though the vehicle company is formally supposed to be separated, its strength, 
largely, depends on the financial robustness and capacity of its shareholders (Parikh and 
Samson 1999). In this sense, the indicator, ‘SPV solidity’, is quantified through the solidity 
of the SPV’s partners as a weighted ‘Average size of partners’ (PART_SIZE) parameter. 
Here, in order to measure the solidity, the market capitalization value of the mother company, 
measured in billions of US dollars (Financial Times, 2009), is adopted. It is assumed that the 
higher the average size of partners, the higher the financial robustness of the SPV. 
Data Analysis 
Project Dataset 
Based on the proposed risk model and dataset of BOT toll road projects, Table 2 summarizes 
the independent variables that are hypothesized to have an influence on the capital structure 
of BOT project financing. The figures reported down into the columns are, respectively, the 
minimum, mean, and maximum value, the low, median and upper quartile, and the standard 
deviation. 
 Min Mean Max Low quartile 
Median 
quartile 
Upper 
quartile 
Standard 
deviation 
Dependent variable        
        
Equity Share [%] 13 29 45 20 27 40 10 
        
Independent variables        
        
Country index 1.15 1.24 1.40 1.15 1.2 1.35 0.08 
Government effectiveness -0.16 0.94 1.99 0.16 1.18 1.54 0.72 
Regulatory quality -0.33 0.86 1.65 -0.13 1.23 1.46 0.75 
Average Beta of partners 0.33 0.77 1.81 0.56 0.73 0.96 0.33 
Inflation rate 0.014 0.041 0.094 0.028 0.035 0.054 0.02 
Currency exchange rate 0.0012 0.416 1.15 0.018 0.0338 1 0.46 
Population in the area [mil] 0.07 13.98 76.00 2.73 5.00 20.57 19.28 
Investment [mil $] 13.20 516.04 22,214.20 153.90 412.69 436.10 519.50 
Construction duration [years] 1.00 2.93 6.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 1.34 
Concession period [years] 12.00 32.09 99.00 24.25 30.00 33.00 16.93 
Number of partners in SPV 1 3 6 2 3 3 1.18 
Average size of partners [mil $] 0.01 3.77 9.80 1.41 3.54 5.09 2.81 
 Table 2. Summary of the exploratory analysis on the dataset of BOT toll road projects  
The sample is composed of 31 pay toll road projects. The projects, selected from various 
geographical areas around the world and equally in both, developed and developing, 
countries, are characterized as having an approximate $500 million average investment and 
equity share, ranging from 13 to 45 percent of the total investment, with the most frequent 
value around 29%. This progression goes beyond the expected typical values, ranging 
between 20% and 30% (Tiong 1995); thus, we have urged a close scrutiny of the factors that 
might motivate its variability. 
Data Sources 
Data for the exogenous variables are collected from various public web sources. The 
‘Country Index’ parameter is measured by Coface, a global leader in trade-credit information 
and protection. Coface assigns a rating to each of the 150 monitored countries; this rating 
reflects the average risk of short-term non-payment for companies in a specific country. 
‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Quality’ are provided by World Bank (2011). 
They are part of a panel of six parameters reported for 213 countries. ‘Beta’ values are given 
by the Financial Time (2009). The ‘Inflation rate’ is provided by Inflation Data (2011) and 
this is reported as the difference between the ‘Current Consumer Price Index’ and the 
‘Consumer Price Index’ a year ago. The ‘Currency Exchange’ is drawn from XE website 
(2011), based on independent third-party site rankings. The ‘Population within the Area’ is 
recorded from Wikipedia (2008): with this regard, the citizens of all cities crossed by the road 
are summed up. 
Data of project-specific and SPV-related parameters, such as ‘Equity share’, ‘Investment’, 
‘Number of Partners in SPV’, ‘Construction duration’, and ‘Concession Period’ are collected 
via several web sources of two natures: concessionaires’ websites [1], [2], [3], [4] and public 
databases [5], [6], and [7]. Table 3 shows the list of the dataset projects with select associated 
data. 
Project # 
Equity  
Share 
[%] 
Investment 
[€ millions] 
No. of 
Partners in 
SPV 
Avg. Size of 
Partners [€ 
billions] 
Construction 
Duration 
[years] 
Concession 
Period 
[years] 
1 24.51 246.00 3 8.08 2 40 
2 28.00 24.70 3 0.01 2 15 
3 30.00 13.20 2 0.02 3 12 
4 30.00 110.50 2 4.93 4 20 
5 42.00 23.40 3 1.17 3 30 
6 38.00 32.80 3 0.12 2 20 
7 18.18 2,214.20 5 8.30 3 30 
8 36.93 1,113.20 6 4.15 4 30 
9 19.40 258.50 2 9.80 2 30 
10 29.52 521.00 4 8.10 2 30 
11 45.33 560.00 4 4.21 6 30 
12 21.55 427.00 1 2.52 1 25 
13 25.00 600.00 4 6.61 3 30 
14 14.61 956.06 2 2.81 2 50 
15 20.03 464.25 1 8.09 5 35 
16 17.45 1,405.00 2 5.14 5 75 
17 20.91 232.13 4 3.54 3 25 
18 23.88 424.08 2 3.29 2 99 
19 19.99 436.56 2 3.54 3 35 
20 40.00 305.79 3 0.02 3 24 
21 20.00 1,225.00 2 4.02 3 40 
22 42.49 253.00 3 1.72 2 30 
23 33.49 218.00 3 1.85 1 15 
24 45.33 560.00 4 4.21 6 30 
25 13.30 107.90 2 7.31 1 30 
26 18.00 85.80 3 3.17 2 15 
27 26.71 1,460.00 2 3.86 3 34 
28 44.37 1,010.21 3 4.09 5 30 
29 40.00 401.30 3 1.31 2 30 
30 16.07 280.00 2 2.81 3 30 
31 37.60 166.70 5 1.86 1 30 
Table 3: List of the dataset projects with select associated data 
Hypotheses 
Based on the mentioned research and theory about the risk profile of BOT projects, this paper 
proposes a model composed of twelve independent variables that are suggested to have 
influence on the capital structure of BOT projects and, in particular, on the level of equity. 
Specifically, it is assumed that the equity portion of the capital structure of a BOT project is 
not only determined so as to optimize the profitability of the projected cash flow, but it is also 
a function of the risk profile and, in turn, the main risk factors, uncovered so far, might affect 
its optimal level. Indeed, the equity share is affected by risk as far as debt lenders are likely to 
carefully scrutinize the risk involved with one project for determining the debt to equity ratio. 
Thus, it is a primary objective of this work to test if the independent variables considered are 
relevant factors and whether they have positive or negative impact. A positive influence 
indicates that, all else remaining equal, an increase (decrease) in the independent variable 
determines an increase (decrease) of the dependent one, while a negative effect produces 
opposite outcome between independent and response variable variations. 
On the one hand, it is assumed that ‘Country index’, ‘Government effectiveness’, ‘Regulatory 
quality’, ‘Average beta of partners’, ‘Currency exchange rate’, ‘Construction duration’, and 
‘Number of partner in SPV’ shall have a positive influence on the equity share. In particular, 
‘Country index’ is expected to show off a positive influence in the sense that, under a stable 
political and economic environment of the host country, with lower country index, the 
likelihood that a project will be called to a halt is reduced and the risk that the SPV’s cash 
flow would be jeopardized is lessened. Consequently, lending institutions are willing to lend 
more money to a firm if the debt repayment capacity is high, resulting in a reduced need for 
equity by the borrowing firm. 
On the contrary, higher country indices could lead to reluctance in funding projects with high 
debt leverages. Similarly, the ‘Government effectiveness’ and the ‘Regulatory quality’ 
parameters are supposed to have a positive impact on the equity share; in fact, high values 
stand for reliable and stable countries, where private investors are encouraged to invest. 
Also, a high ‘Average Beta of partners’, as a proxy measure of a high SPV risk, is likely to 
require a high level of equity, because lending agencies might be unwilling to provide bulk 
debt service in such situations. 
The ‘Currency exchange rate’ is also expected to have positive impact on the equity level; in 
the sense that, if the local currency appreciates, revenues converted into US dollars arise, so 
that private investors are willing to put more funds into the project investment. 
‘Construction duration’, as a proxy indication of the project complexity and inherent risk of 
delay, rework and cost overruns, is likely to be the reason that prevents lending agencies from 
providing large debt leverage, thus giving SPV participants no choice but to raise higher 
equity share into the total project investment (Logan 2003). 
Finally, the higher the ‘Number of partners in the SPV’, the higher is the expected capability 
to raise the equity portion of financing. 
In contrast, ‘Inflation rate’, ‘Population within the area’, ‘Investment’, ‘Concession period’, 
and ‘Average size of partners’ might disclose a negative impact on the equity share of the 
investment. In fact, higher the ‘Inflation rate’, more the debt capacity and lower the equity 
level. This fact is due to two simultaneous effects directed to increase the DSCR, namely: 
increased revenue and reduced interest as a derivative macroeconomic consequence of 
inflation.  
Furthermore, a large ‘Population within the area’ would give high chances of revenue, which 
in turn, would allow the SPV to easily obtain bulk debt packages with a low level of equity. 
Similarly, a large-sized investment might be an indicator of the project complexity and 
inherent risk, so that the equity portion of funding is likely to get lower. 
Also, a long ‘Concession period’ should justify the maximization of long-term debt through 
fixed rate financing structuring, which, in turn, relies on a lower share of equity investment 
(Tiong and Alum 1997). 
Finally, a large ‘Average size of partners’ should provide adequate assurance that high debt 
leverage will be reimbursed and that minimum equity contribution should be required.  
With the purpose of challenging the proposed risk model and associated hypotheses, the 
following section illustrates the linear regression model used for the empirical examination of 
the twelve theoretically relevant predictors on the ‘Equity share’, taken as the response 
parameter. 
Regression analysis 
The normal probability plot of the data set (Figure 1) testifies that residuals are normally 
distributed and errors are uncorrelated random variables, so that a linear regression model is 
applicable to examine the significance of independent variables. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
First, the presence of multicollinearity among independent variables is explored. 
Multicollinearity is the correlation among predictors resulting in an increased standard error 
of estimates, which makes it difficult to accurately interpret the findings of the regression 
analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). It occurs whenever a large R results from regressing a 
single independent variable in a multivariate model. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
used to measure the degree of multicollinearity (Wei et al, 2011) of the independent variable, 
with the other independent variables in a regression model. VIF evaluates the relationship 
between an independent variable and all other independent variables within the model and is 
termed as 1/(1-R2), where R2 is the coefficient of determination of one predictor on all the 
other predictors and it represents the proportion of the variance in the independent variable 
that is associated with the other independent variables in the model. If VIF equals 1, there is 
no multicollinearity; if it ranges from 1 to 4, predictors may be moderately correlated; if VIF 
is greater than 4, the regression coefficients are poorly estimated (O’Brien 2007). A 
suggestion that directly addresses the problem of reducing multicollinearity is to re-specify 
the model by eliminating one or more of the independent variables that are highly correlated 
with the other independent variables.  
 CI GE RQ BETA_PART IR CR POP INV CDUR CPER PART PART_SIZE 
VIF 15.463 30.72 18.497 2.68 3.192 4.1 2.39 2.791 1.64 1.783 2.532 2.773 
Table 4: Multicollinearity in the complete model 
Table 4 shows that multicollinearity exists in our model because CI, GR and RQ have a very 
high VIF. Therefore these predictors have been discarded in order to avoid multicollinearity 
as presented in Table 5. 
  BETA_PART IR CR POP INV CDUR CPER PART PART_SIZE 
VIF 1.792 1.667 2.488 1.549 2.41 1.431 1.509 1.705 1.757 
Table 5. Proof that the model has no multicollinearity among predictors 
After the exploration of multicollinearity, the regression analysis is performed. Table 6 
presents the results of the regression analysis, where the columns report the estimate of the 
regression coefficient, the standard error of the coefficient estimate, the value of t statistic and 
the p value with the associated level of significance, respectively. 
 Acronym Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value  
       
Average Beta of Partners BETA_PART -0.01125 0.04697 -0.24 0.814  
Inflation Rate IR -1.5652 0.7360 -2.13 0.049 * 
Currency Exchange Rate CR 0.03447 0.03847 0.90 0.384  
Population within the area POP -0.0005564 0.000680 -0.82 0.425  
Investment INV -0.0001156 0.000033 -3.42 0.004 ** 
Construction Duration CDUR 0.041676 0.009622 4.33 0.001 ** 
Concession Period CPER -0.0005236 0.000745 -0.70 0.492  
Number of Partners in SPV PART 0.04278 0.01244 3.44 0.030 * 
Average Size of Partners PART_SIZE -0.15284 0.005160 -2.96 0.009 ** 
       
Multiple R-Squared  79.60     
Adjusted R-Square  68.10     
Constant  0.23815     
Significance notation  0 *** 0.001** 0.01*   
Table 6. Results of the regression analysis 
The regression analysis shows that IR, INV, CDUR, PART and PART_SIZE are significant 
factors, influencing the equity portion of financing of a BOT project. On the contrary, 
BETA_PART, CR, POP, and CPER are proven to not have significant influence on the 
capital structure. 
The high R-squared value suggests that the regression line is a good fitting curve of real data 
points and that a large percentage of the variability is accounted for in the statistical model. In 
addition, the high-adjusted R-Square, which is not notably lower than the R-Square, confirms 
that the proposed model includes all the explanatory variables and the variation on the 
response variable is fully measured (Everitt, 2002). 
Interpretation of results 
Five out of the nine aforementioned independent variables show statistical relevance to the 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
Some of the relevant drivers confirm expected inherent relationships with the equity fraction 
of capital investment. For instance, an increased project complexity, by some means, 
indicated by the number of partners and by the length of the construction period, drives a 
large amount of equity funds. In fact, the higher the number of partners involved in a project, 
the higher the capacity to raise equity financing. In addition, the positive impact of the 
construction length underlines that construction risk is an important component: a long 
construction period implies a high risk of cost overrun and delay, thus making lending 
agencies reluctant to highly leverage the debt portion of funding. 
Similarly, the relationship between the size of the project and the equity allocation is 
clarified: a large-sized investment imposes a heavy burden on project promoters to contribute 
with their equity in total amount, but smaller in percent share. The positive impacts on the 
equity share of the average size of partners is based on the idea that the higher the solidity of 
a company, the easier for that company to raise the equity contribution. 
Also, the inflation rate confirms the negative effect on the equity share of a BOT project, 
because of its ability to increase cash flow revenue.  
Finally, results show that the ‘Concession Period’, ‘Population within the Area’, ‘Currency 
exchange rate’, and ‘Average Beta of Partner’ variables do not pose significant influence, if 
any, on the equity share. 
Discussion and Implications 
The analysis reveals that the inherent characteristics of both, the project and SPV, are 
significant factors of the fraction of equity funds required to implement a BOT contract, 
while external factors linked, for instance, to the host country and financial environment, are 
likely to have lower influence. In particular, the size and complexity of the project, as well as 
the composition and financial solidity of the partners involved in the SPV, prove to be 
determinants of the equity share. To be more precise, the size of the investment and the 
solidity of the SPV prove to have a negative impact on the level of equity, while the 
complexity of a project and the composition of the consortium carry a higher share of equity. 
In other terms, investors of large-sized projects are likely to resort to other financial sources, 
such as public funds, for transferring out portions of risk; similarly, financially strong 
consortiums of partners are likely to be capable of borrowing more debt funds and, in turn, be 
required for raising a lower level of equity. On the contrary, complex projects with typical 
long construction duration and numerous investing partners will likely require more equity 
financing. 
Finally, inflation is the only exogenous financial variable that is probable to influence the 
level of equity, as it is possible that a high inflation rate is a factor of an increased debt 
capacity due to its contribution to cash flow generation. 
Both practical and theoretical implications arise from these results. 
The implication for investors and lending agencies is the potential undertaking of changes in 
the way the BOT capital structure is arranged. In fact, the presented regression model might 
serve as a predictive reference study in refining decision criteria for determining debt 
leverage in BOT toll road projects. The results may provide some hints to lending agencies 
for improving the currently used DSCR-based method to determine the equity leverage. In 
particular, lenders might determine the project risk score through the evaluation of the above 
proxy variables. 
Additionally, results might be considered as a clue for project promoters to better understand 
what kind of financial contract clauses and business environment might facilitate high debt 
leverages. For instance, they might take advantage of establishing consortiums composed of 
just a few solid partners, bidding for middle-sized projects, which are likely to be less 
complex. 
From an academic perspective, this work offers sound contributions. On the one hand, it 
proposes to consider risk as an intrinsic factor affecting the capital structure of BOT projects. 
On the other hand, it urges the need for exploring improved methodologies aimed at sizing 
the debt capacity of a BOT project, in combination with the classical financial covenants used 
by lending institutions. To this end, future research is addressed in the development of 
models for the study of the capital structure of various categories and kinds of BOT projects. 
Conclusion 
Claiming that the capital structure of a BOT project is notably influenced by the project’s 
inherent risks, a model is developed with the purpose of understanding the risk factors that 
may influence the equity share of a BOT toll road capital investment. In particular, country, 
financial, revenue, project and SPV related risks are defined along with their associated 
indicators and parameters. 
Based on that model, various data, pertinent to the mentioned risk drivers, are collected from 
a number of recent BOT pay toll road projects and a linear regression empirical analysis is 
performed. The analysis shows that inflation, project size, construction duration, financial 
strength of the SPV, and the number of SPV’s partners have a significant relationship with 
the share of equity into the total investment. 
In conclusion, this research might help the purpose of better understanding the main factors 
affecting the equity contribution to BOT investments, which, in turn, provide opportunities 
for sponsors to improve the equity profitability and for lending agencies to better handle risks 
associated with the debt supply. 
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